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International
Entrepreneurship
and Capability
Development—Qualitative
Evidence and Future
Research Directions
Erkko Autio
Gerard George
Oliver Alexy
In this article, we explore how new capabilities emerge and solidify in new ventures that are
faced with fundamental uncertainty from their environment. To do so, we draw from the
organizational and entrepreneurial literature on cognition and capabilities. Using initial
qualitative evidence from a multifirm study in the context of new venture internationalization,
we develop a cognition-based model of capability emergence in new ventures. Our findings
extend the capability development and learning implications of internationalization to the
fundamental character of organizing processes in start-ups. Moreover, we derive avenues for
future entrepreneurship research on the origins and evolution of capabilities in new ventures.
An important strand of entrepreneurship research—that of international
entrepreneurship—has induced renewed interest in the role of organizational capabilities
on firm performance (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000; Bingham, 2009; Keupp &
Gassmann, 2009; Knight & Cavusgil, 2004; Sapienza, Autio, George, & Zahra, 2006).
Several interesting and counterintuitive conclusions have already been suggested that
highlight differences between entrepreneurial and more mature firms; notable among
these findings is the relationship between capabilities and firm performance. Whereas the
literature on organizational capabilities tends to emphasize the importance of well-formed
capabilities for firm performance, entrepreneurship scholars suggest that the absence of
well-formed capabilities may be a source of entrepreneurial advantage, particularly in new
and rapidly changing environments (Sapienza et al.; Sine, Mitsuhashi, & Kirsch, 2006).
Though inspiring, the literatures of international entrepreneurship and organizational
capabilities remain largely silent when it comes to the study of capability emergence
in entrepreneurial firms. In particular, micro-level studies on this phenomenon have
been lacking. In this article, we address this gap by using the context of new venture
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internationalization as the lens through which we highlight the dynamics of capability
development in entrepreneurial firms. In addition to contributing an inductive case study
on entrepreneurial capability development, we seek to outline a broader research agenda
for the study of organizational capabilities in entrepreneurship.
A central theme in organizational and entrepreneurial studies concerns the ability of
firms to respond to uncertainty through endogenous strategic and structural adaptation by
developing and deploying capabilities (Gavetti, 2005; Levinthal, 2000; McMullen &
Shepherd, 2006). Capabilities refer to a firm’s capacity to purposefully deploy a combi-
nation of resources and processes to achieve a desired goal (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).
Often referred to as routines or repetitive patterns of task-oriented actions involving
multiple actors (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003), these processes emphasize action-
based mechanisms for organizational adaptation. Under this logic, both new and estab-
lished organizations draw on existing routines developed in prior environments and
initiate task-focused actions to execute specific tasks.
Building on these arguments, the entrepreneurship literature on capability formation
in start-ups focuses on how prior experiences constitute the source and foundation of new
ventures’ capabilities (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Mosakowski, 1998). Founders import
routines they know from previous professional roles, where these routines are either
re-used directly, or modified and recombined through behavioral adaption, and ultimately
congeal to form the organizational capabilities of the start-up (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003).
However, this approach falls short of explaining how new ventures develop and deploy
new capabilities that transcend imported routines rather than be circumscribed by them
(Zahra, Sapienza, & Davidsson, 2006).
An adaptation logic to new capability creation in entrepreneurial firms is problematic
for two reasons. First, the direct re-use of routines originating from the founders’ profes-
sional past will often be restricted because actions precipitated by such routines reflect the
business logic of the environment for which they were conceived. When previously
developed routines are inappropriate or even nonexisting, the probity of routines-based
explanations for capability development is diminished (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000) and
cognitive explanations may be more appropriate (Gavetti, 2005; Grégoire, Barr, & Shep-
herd, 2010). Second, in unknown environments, behavioral adaptation of existing routines
may be insufficient to form new capabilities. Still, even recent literature on capability
emergence and solidification in start-ups (e.g., Bingham, 2009; Bingham, Eisenhardt, &
Furr, 2007) has emphasized the role of reconfiguration of existing processes rather than
the creation of de novo ones. Again, an adaptation-focused logic may be only poorly
suited to understanding the nascence of routines in radically different environments.
Consequently, while much is known about behavioral adaptation in situations where
either an explicit or tacitly shared business logic exists to guide a firm’s process-based
adaptation, the creation and interplay of cognitive understandings, goal specification, and
task-focused organizational actions remains an unexplored area (see, e.g., Grégoire, Barr
et al., 2010). In short, received literature fails to explain how new ventures develop and
deploy new capabilities when faced with fundamentally new situations. In this study, we
present qualitative evidence on uncertainty-driven cognition and capability development in
the context of new venture internationalization. In so doing, our objective is to generate new
theoretical insights on what drives start-ups to develop new capabilities and provide
avenues for further research in this area.
The rich literature on organizational and managerial cognition provides an alternative
lens to organizational adaptation (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Gavetti, 2005; March
& Simon, 1958; Weick & Bougon, 1986) and capability emergence. This literature
emphasizes the role of cognitive processes and sensemaking centered on perceived
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causation as the key regulator of organizational actions and subsequent routine develop-
ment. The routines that underlie firms’ capabilities can also have emergent properties in
their own right, as organizational agents mindfully modify activities to achieve ends and
execute tasks that their experience suggests are valuable (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000).
Opposed to the action-based approach that sees automated, repetitive responses to envi-
ronmental stimuli as the origin of organizational capabilities, in the cognition-based view,
these emerge through interplay between cognition (i.e., perceptions of valuable goals and
appropriate means to pursue them) and behavioral routines.
A focus on routines alone has contributed to a gap in our understanding of how
cognition of purpose-oriented business logic is initially formed, how initial preroutines for
achieving identified goals are created, and how the interplay between cognitive under-
standings and goal-oriented action create a platform for subsequent capability develop-
ment. Even though studies invoking a capability lens tend to emphasize the reconfiguring
of routines to enable adaptation (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen,
1997), it remains unclear how, at a micro level, emergent causal understandings and
probing actions enable firms to withstand high uncertainty arising from changing exog-
enous pressures and how this interplay provides a platform for capability development.
Therefore, explaining how processes underlying capabilities are created, modified, or
combined can add to causal theories of organizational adaptation and strategic change
(Barr et al., 1992). This is particularly true for the entrepreneurship literature, where a
cognitive perspective emphasizing mental processes such as sensemaking from which
value-creating behavior emerges is still largely underrepresented (Grégoire, Corbett, &
McMullen, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2007). Whereas current research emphasizes the effects
of uncertainty-based cognition on entrepreneurial behavior in general (Haynie, Shepherd,
Mosakowski, & Earley, 2010; McKelvie, Haynie, & Gustavsson, 2010), an explanation of
how uncertainty-based cognition influences the development and deployment of new
capabilities in start-ups is yet missing.
To develop initial insights on capability development under uncertainty, we needed a
setting that had a high uncertainty where existing routines could not easily traverse.
Hence, we explored the factors influencing the development of new capabilities in a field
study of high-tech start-ups that expand their operations into foreign markets. We focused
on the causal processes by which capabilities emerge during international market entry,
rather than the content of these capabilities. Fundamentally, internationalization is a
process that is executed under conditions of high situational uncertainty. While different
definitions and interpretations of uncertainty exist in the entrepreneurship literature, we
refer specifically to the work of Alvarez and Barney (2005) and to the work of McMullen
and Shepherd (2006). Alvarez and Barney describe an investment decision into a market
opportunity as uncertain “when the possible outcomes of this decision and the probability
of those outcomes are not known when a decision is made” (p. 778)—reflective of the
definition of Knightian uncertainty. McMullen and Shepherd, based on Milliken’s (1987)
seminal article, extend this Knightian view by pointing out that it is agnostic of entrepre-
neurial discovery and conceptualize how the perceived level of uncertainty and the
willingness to bear uncertainty may impact entrepreneurial action. Specifically regarding
the level of uncertainty, different information shortages experienced by entrepreneurial
actors in seemingly identical situations will explain why they may still be subject to
varying levels of uncertainty (McMullen & Shepherd; Milliken).1
1. For example, prior experience gained from exposure to a similar setting might reduce uncertainty in the
focal situation (Alvarez & Barney, 2005)—independent of the level of uncertainty experience in any of the
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Following these arguments, we define situational uncertainty as the combination of
firm-specific, context-dependent ambiguity, variability, and complexity of institutional,
product, and market conditions where the new venture’s appropriate course of action is
not immediately apparent—prompting researchers to offer capability-based explanations
for the performance of internationalizing firms (Delios & Beamish, 2001). The visibility
and multiplicity in international entry processes and their outcomes present an appropriate
sample to examine issues underlying capability development (McDougall, Shane, &
Oviatt, 1994; Sapienza et al., 2006).
The situational uncertainty associated with internationalization created multiple
opportunities for the firms in our sample to learn from their international exposure, as
some enacted organizational processes that yielded successful outcomes while others
failed. These heterogeneous experiences triggered two distinct outcomes. First, start-ups
developed a robust set of organizing processes through repeated exposure to varying
intensities of situational uncertainty. When faced with multiple different contexts with
similar underlying drivers of situational uncertainty (repeated uncertainty), as well as
varying degrees of ambiguity, variability, and complexity (intensity of uncertainty), start-
ups responded by developing new or modified organizing processes or by discarding
existing ones. By “organizing processes,” we refer to the sets of activities related to
entering a new market, establishing a business infrastructure, and devising and initiating
transactions to buy, sell, or manufacture a product or service in a foreign market. As the
start-ups’ exposure to situational uncertainty varied in terms of repetition and intensity,
they also differed in the diversity in their repertoire of organizing processes developed as
a response, as well as in terms of their dexterity in executing these processes. Therefore,
the heterogeneity of learning experiences not only fostered the multiplicity of organizing
processes (i.e., increased diversity) but also made these start-ups more adept at executing
these processes (i.e., increased dexterity).
Second, these start-ups developed a cognitive map of cause–effect relationships
between specific processes and their outcomes (which we term transparency), and an
understanding of the timing and selection of specific processes to deploy in combination
with others in response to varying institutional or market conditions (termed percipience).
We refer to the capacity to combine the vocabulary of processes and the holistic compre-
hension of their interdependencies as the language of organizing. We found that start-ups
developed their own language of organizing, with varying degrees of success, by building
a rich repertoire of processes and a shared cognition of what and when to deploy these
processes to enact a dynamic adaptation to their environment.
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, this study provides a window into the
factors influencing new capability formation in start-ups, addressing a void in our under-
standing of the importance of capabilities in entrepreneurial firms. The opacity of the
capabilities concept, in definition and measurement, confounds both the capabilities and
the entrepreneurship literature, as the notion of repetitive routines is incongruous with
common beliefs about the practice of entrepreneurship. For instance, founders tend to
perceive their activities as improvisations or idiosyncratic acts of connecting opportunities
to resources (Aldrich, 1999; Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003) rather than repetitive behavior.
Our study reveals that it is not only the improvising nature of actions, but also the
awareness of the repertoire of organizing activities and a comprehension of their combi-
nations that likely yields successful outcomes. We found two important moderators of the
two situations. See also our definitions of “repeated uncertainty” and “intensity of uncertainty”
subsequently.
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link between situational uncertainty and formation of new capabilities, namely, resource
fungibility and shared experiences of managers. Resource fungibility (the ability to shift
them to alternate uses) increased the formation of new capabilities by enhancing the
multiplicity of possible process combinations, whereas shared experiences retarded the
formation of new capabilities by discouraging the generation of new customized solutions
for international entry.
Second, this study elaborates upon the causal logic of the influence of learning to
explain the formation and deployment of capabilities. While a substantial body of orga-
nizational learning research exists, only recently has there been an emphasis on learning
from success and failure experiences (Corbett, Neck, & DeTienne, 2007; Haunschild &
Sullivan, 2002; Kim & Miner, 2007; Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001; Miner, Kim,
Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1999). The findings add to the rich dialogue on the impact of
learning on firm behavior by clarifying the complex mechanisms by which heterogeneity
in success and failure experiences influence the emergence of capabilities. In particular,
we highlight the importance of cognition in the formation of new capabilities, showing
that the repeated exposure to situational uncertainty compelled the firm to expand both its
set of organizing processes and its awareness of the cause–effect relationships among
them. In so doing, the start-up developed a deeper understanding of its repertoire of
responses to exogenous stimuli and developed an idiosyncratic language of organizing
(Aldrich, 1999; Baker et al., 2003).
Third, we propose an agenda for future research to advance the entrepreneurship
literature in the area of capability emergence and establishment. Our findings point toward
three domains in this field of research that will greatly benefit from additional scrutiny.
First, the literature is unclear about the role of internal versus external triggers for
capability development. Second, future research could increasingly look toward the role
of individuals and the imprints they may leave in firms and how these, in turn, affect
capability emergence. Finally, for the international entrepreneurship literature, we suggest
avenues for future research that adopt cognition and capability-based lenses to examine
drivers of successful internationalization.
Method
We conducted a longitudinal field study using multiple case studies as our primary
source of empirical evidence. We took several steps to ensure appropriate sampling and
adequate variance in market entry capabilities. First, we selected firms that commenced
their international operations within the previous 5 years to minimize validity issues
related to recall bias. This effectively translated into internationalization as an event that
occurred within 5 years of start-up formation. Second, this sample allowed us to obtain
detailed information on changes in knowledge and learning from new markets as each
entry had a perceptible impact on the firm and was vivid in the entrepreneur and man-
agement team’s memory. Third, as most of our start-ups belonged to the ICT sector,
differences in actions were less likely to be induced solely by differences in technology or
customer profile, simplifying interpretation and increasing our confidence regarding the
causes of variation in our observations. Fourth, because firms may differ in their capability
development based on entry mode choices (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Zahra, Ireland,
& Hitt, 2000), we selected start-ups representing both direct (e.g., direct sales, subsidiary)
and indirect (e.g., agent, reseller) foreign market entry mechanisms. Fifth, we selected
start-ups with variance in geographical markets entered, as such variance may affect
learning through internationalization efforts. Finally, our sample represented varying
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levels of success with internationalization efforts. A brief description of our sample is
provided in Table 1.
Our sample consists of 10 Finnish firms that expanded globally early in their life. We
selected this sample using secondary sources including the local (Helsinki) technology
council, industry association data, and company websites. This information was further
used to narrow the interviewee list and as background information to prepare for the initial
interviews. Eight of these firms are start-ups that operate in the ICT sector. Two more firms
(EXCEL,2 ROLL) were not classified as start-ups as they had been in existence more than
8 years when we began our data collection. Yet, as these firms commenced their interna-
tional operations within the previous 5-year window, we used them as a comparison group
to improve generalizability.
Interview Process
We adopted a semistructured process that facilitated a free expression of the entre-
preneur’s ideas and allowed us to compare responses across subsequent interviews and
draw lessons. With at least one of the authors present, interviews were conducted by two
or three (typically three) individuals, increasing our confidence in the reliability of
interpretation. Our initial interview with each start-up was attended by two or more
interviewees to alleviate concerns of source and recall bias (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). In
most cases, the founder was accompanied by members of the management team respon-
sible for either operations or international markets. Other team members present were
encouraged to correct facts pertaining to the interviews such as timing or outcomes but not
why certain events transpired. This technique helped ascertain the facts of each case but
allowed freedom in causal attributions. Follow-on interviews were conducted with either
one or two team members present. Overall, we collected data from 41 semistructured
interviews that ranged from 30 to 90 minutes each, for a total of approximately 70 hours,
all of which was recorded and transcribed. We conducted our first set of interviews in Fall
2002 and follow-up interviews at 6- to 9-month intervals with the last set of interviews in
Fall 2004, and we followed them subsequently to track survival outcomes. All entrepre-
neurs spoke English; when comments were made in Finnish, these were translated.
Subsequently, the interviewers independently assessed transcripts and prepared notes that
were reconciled to provide a comprehensive interpretation of interviewees’ comments.
To avoid errors arising from halo effects and other interpretation biases (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998), the transcribed notes were used by a subset of team members (including at
least one team member not present at the interviews) to establish a preliminary frame-
work. We followed an iterative process of marking quotes and concepts on note cards,
systematically arranging these cards into themes and concepts across interviews, and
reviewing our notes to identify patterns or themes across interviewees. This process was
based on well-established norms of inductive research (Lee, 1999). The method provided
a comprehensive description of the underlying processes involved and helped us develop
a framework of capability formation during internationalization.
Identifying and Operationalizing a “Capability”
Following prior studies, we looked for firm’s development and deployment of orga-
nizational capabilities specific to foreign market entry (Autio et al., 2000; McDougall &
2. We created pseudonyms for each company to obscure their identity.
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Table 1
Descriptions of Firms
Company Employees Brief description Comments
CASH 12 CASH is a mobile/web-enabled corporate treasury
management services that help multinational firms
manage their foreign exchange treasury transactions in a
coordinated manner. Founded in 2000, it has offices in
two countries and is expanding to other sites.
Rapid expansion and then trying to
get traction in markets. Global
customer base makes it difficult to
co-locate offices.
CHART 70 CHART sells mobile applications that enhance data
collection in clinical research and development.
Founded in 2000, it has offices in five countries. Only
direct sales techniques are used.
Direct sales from offices to proximate
markets. Often projects are
conducted in countries other than
where sale occurs.
EXCEL 800 EXCEL sells project management software for
corporations. Founded in 1983, the firm has had three
internationalization phases. The first two
internationalization phases (1986–1994) were minor.
EXCEL went public and executed an aggressive
international acquisition strategy (1999–2003).
Currently the company has subsidiaries in nine
countries.
Around 10 acquisitions failed to
materialize. This is the only
publicly traded firm in our sample
of technology ventures.
GAME 40 GAME sells mobile games. The end customers are
consumers and they are reached primarily through
mobile operators and secondarily through media
companies. Sales to the end-user interface are primarily
through direct sales in Europe, and through agents and
resellers outside Europe. The company was founded
in 2000.
In Europe, the initial reseller strategy
changed to direct sales.
HELLO 20 HELLO sells mobile customer relationship management
software to application service providers. Founded in
2000 with operations in four countries, HELLO has
physical office space in two of those countries. Resellers
are used in some markets.
Two offices closed. Sales position
terminated and entry mode
changed to selling through existing
sales channels.
ROLL 12 ROLL has a patented system for the paper manufacturing
industry. The company helps manufacturers design their
production system to be compact and efficient. Founded
in 1993, ROLL has had several international clients but
has one office located in the United States.
Clients are dispersed in Germany,
France, Sweden, and the United
States. Work is more project-driven
with different size and duration of
projects.
SNOW 25 SNOW is a pioneering weather service information
provider through multiple information channels.
Founded in 1996, SNOW started with only the Finnish
market and then expanded to other Scandinavian
markets.
The entrepreneur is a woman who
is successful with a grow–
consolidate–grow strategy in a
competitive E.U. market.
SPOT 20 SPOT sells a positioning technology for Wi-Fi. Founded
in 2000, SPOT has an office in the United States and a
sales representative in Hong Kong. The firm has sold
through its websites to several countries.
Virtual offices: 2
Internet domains: about 20
One virtual office upgraded to a
front office.
STAR 15 STAR sells mobile office applications. The end customers
are companies, but sales are handled through mobile
operators, to whom STAR sells directly. It has an active
partnering strategy that offers its technology in
combination with partner applications. Founded in
2000, the company operates primarily in the European
market.
Intended to establish a subsidiary but
backed out and never completed
the move.
TUNES 34 TUNES is a leading producer of streaming video for
mobile technologies. Founded in 1996, TUNES
internationalized by seeking out mobile service
providers as partners to enable revenue generation
through value-added mobile services.
In 1999, TUNES went through a
significant turnaround process and
revamped and refocused its
business aggressively as an
international player.
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Oviatt, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000). However, whereas prior studies frequently assume a
deliberate intent to develop a capability and a planned outcome to capture the effective-
ness of deployment, we did not assign a priori intent as a condition to develop a capability,
as firms may develop capabilities accidentally or without a cogent sequence of preplanned
actions (George, 2005a), especially in international contexts where situational uncertainty
may be high. In addition, we faced challenges in operationalizing capabilities using
existing, routine-based definitions (Winter, 2003). We were cognizant of the possibility
that international market entry activities may not be repeated in the same form, and
therefore might fail to meet this definition. Although our data revealed some repetition, a
substantive subset were not repeated, even when outcomes were successful, indicating
that the execution of activities may have depended upon the start-up’s cognitive model of
cause–effect relationships.
Therefore, we adopted a working definition of a capability as a combination or
sequence of processes and its enabling resource commitments that have the potential to
reliably achieve outputs congruent with organizational goals. While a process could also
be a routine, a routine did not have to be present in order to be recorded as a notable
process. Using this broader lens, we were able to observe new, ancillary, modified, and
nonrepetitive processes that might be built into a capability. Also, we inferred that a
start-up’s use of a variety of processes in a variety of combinations or sequences implied
that it: (1) has a repertoire of processes, such that not all processes are used at all times or
in the same sequence, yet may still be constituent elements of a capability; and (2) has a
comprehension or belief about which processes can be effectively deployed to attain a
desired outcome.
Organizing Processes and Cognitive Maps
We found two constituent elements of a capability—a set of organizing processes and
a cognitive map to aid decision making on which process to deploy when and in what
sequence. The cognitive map allows for variations of the subset of activities that comprise
each individual process (Barr et al., 1992; Bogner & Barr, 2000). For example, CHART’s
sales strategy used a variety of marketing approaches (from cold calling to organized
marketing and sales visits) that it adjusted in each country that it entered. Not only did the
firm have variants within the sales process, but it also timed the sequence of activities
involved, for example, when to establish its local subsidiary or partner relative to launch-
ing its sales strategy. In one case, CHART found a partner and then began a variant of its
sales process. In another, it began its sales processes and then set up a local office. This
example shows why we prefer an inclusive definition of capability as a combination or
sequence of processes that allows for redundancy among choice of alternative processes
and sequential variations of tasks within each process.
From our data, it became evident that capability development, while triggered by
international entries, was not necessarily contextually determined. The start-ups devel-
oped capabilities that were not constrained to managing individual foreign market entries,
nor were the outcomes of those capabilities necessarily manifested in any single market
context alone. Rather, the organizing processes and related cognitive comprehension
developed during the entries appeared to be migratory in application and mutable in
structure, that is, the applications could migrate to multiple product or market contexts
rather than being embedded or applied solely in international entry. Thus, through
internationalization, the start-ups developed a broader understanding of the processes
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constituting their business, facilitating the development of new capabilities both specific
and unrelated to international market entry.
In Figure 1, we introduce our overall findings on factors influencing the development
of organizational capabilities. Two specific attributes of situational uncertainty, namely
the intensity and repetition of uncertainty, influenced the formation of the two components
of a capability (i.e., organizing processes and cognitive maps). We found that resource
fungibility had a positive moderating effect on the formation of capabilities. Shared
experiences of founders drawn from an organization where they worked together prior to
formation of the start-up negatively moderated the formation of capabilities. We elaborate
upon these findings below.
Influence of Situational Uncertainty on the Repertoire of
Organizing Processes
Our sample consisted of single-business firms that, during international market entry,
attempted to create or invoke a set of suitable organizational processes to achieve a defined
set of business goals. With each market entry, they confronted multiple sources of
uncertainty concerning products; institutional factors (Delios & Henisz, 2003); organiza-
tional structures (Delios & Henisz); resource access (Anand & Singh, 1997); and con-
sumer needs (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). These created a variety of challenges as start-ups
tried to meet their objectives, eliciting a variety of responses and opportunities to learn
from their experiences.
There were two important attributes of situational uncertainty that influenced the
generation of new organizing processes and the formation of a cognitive map: the extent
of uncertainty repetition and the intensity of the situational uncertainty to which the firm
was exposed, where uncertainty repetition captures the number of times the start-up
Figure 1
Framework of Factors Influencing the Development and Deployment
of Capabilities
Situational Uncertainty Organizational Capabilities
(+) 
                (+) 
                (+) 
(–) 
Resource Fungibility 
Repeated Uncertainty 
Intensity of Uncertainty 
Organizing Processes 
• Dexterity 
• Diversity 
Cognitive Maps 
• Transparency 
• Percipience 
Shared Experiences 
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experiences situational uncertainty of a similar kind,3 and intensity captures the cognitive
distance of the focal firm to the level of ambiguity, variability, and complexity presented
by the respective setting (see Alvarez & Barney, 2005; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).
These two attributes of uncertainty influenced both the diversity of organizing processes
and the dexterity with which they were executed. The comment of a chief executive officer
(CEO) [CASH] captured it well:
We’ve had a lot of problems, most of them not significant, but there have been a lot
of them . . . always we have been able to come up with a solution.
Similarly, the managers of HELLO believed that their contacts from prior work in
three countries would lead to faster sales in these countries, but the outcome did not
conform to these expectations. Instead, HELLO had to change its processes to reach
customers in foreign markets.
We were optimistic because we had existing customer contacts in all three countries,
so we naturally said that the best way to get pilots is to go through existing contacts.
We [. . .] anticipated it would take a maximum of 6 months but instead it took a
year . . . we were used to selling something that was already a mature market, then we
discovered something new and said “Hey, why don’t you try this out?” [. . .] So,
looking back we were a little bit too optimistic at that time but our response was pretty
immediate.
Our data were indicative of learning from each entry experience as manifested in the
identification of and experimenting with new ways to organize the business, or in the
adaptation of existing processes and resources. This observation is consistent with Miner
et al. (2001), who found that situational uncertainty influenced the degree to which
product development teams improvised on their actions and deviated from existing rou-
tines. For instance, both CHART and STAR had radically new products and needed to
develop new creative processes to approach the customers and convince them of the merits
of the new product.
We found that repeated exposure to situational uncertainty allowed the firms to
experiment with variations in the sequence of processes. Learning when certain processes
could be deployed were outcomes of success and failure experiences gained from similar
forms of uncertainty encountered in prior entries. Therefore, repeated exposure to uncer-
tainty set in motion the generation of a diverse set of processes and the concomitant ability
to recombine pieces of processes to form a new one that was more likely to work in the
current scenario. Because each market entry revealed a unique set of uncertainties,
experiencing these over time improved the start-up’s dexterity at executing individual
processes and (re)combinations of previously devised ones. This observation is consistent
with other studies that linked deftness in execution to competence development (McGrath,
MacMillan, & Venkataraman, 1995). For example, the CEO of HELLO noted that, as each
market entry tended to be unique, it was incumbent on managers to develop skills for
integrating processes for entering new markets:
The pieces are made in different places. It is quite a learning process that you can
reach the point where different pieces are [developed] in different parts of the world.
You learn to document, you learn to share work, and above everything, [you learn] to
test. There is a shared tool, shared documentation, and communication procedures by
3. Uncertainty repetition captures the number of times that a firm is exposed to similar situational uncertainty
(usually in varying contexts) and not the number of times that a firm is exposed exactly to the same situation.
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which people discuss with each other . . . that make it more effective. So we are able
to bring together these pieces of knowledge and make it work in a new market.
We observed that at high levels of situational uncertainty, the enacted processes were not
necessarily tightly linked to the problem at hand. In these cases, even though the entre-
preneurial team could not decide on the right action sequence and might adopt inappro-
priate strategic actions that resulted in operational setbacks, the trial-and-error learning
outcome was later integrated into their repertoire of organizing processes. For example,
TUNES, a first mover and a leader in streaming video and mobile marketing, was caught
up in the Internet frenzy and overestimated the revenue-generating potential of foreign
markets. Given uncertainty about the foreign market potential, the start-up made invest-
ments and resource commitments that could not be supported with the minimal revenues
that it had generated initially. Concurrently, the high intensity of uncertainty regarding the
evolving industry structure compelled the firm to also modify its organizing processes and
reshape its business model. The CEO [TUNES] commented:
[The foreign markets] are evolving quarter by quarter and the value chains or value
webs are changing and naturally that was something that we didn’t even think that we
could predict . . . that is an operative change because all the time in the media industry
you have to look at who is doing what and what is really the value chain, who buys
the software, who utilizes it, etc. . . . and then you change . . . you change what you do
and how you do it.
This and other comments helped improve our own understanding of capability develop-
ment mechanisms. When the intensity of situational uncertainty was high, the start-ups
sought to forge sense-making routines that enabled them to compare and comprehend
experiences across market environments as well as derive an appropriate sequence for
deploying these processes, corresponding to the establishment of “simple rules” (Eisen-
hardt & Sull, 2001). In contrast, ROLL operates in the paper industry; a mature market
that is relatively stable and with few product or market uncertainties. ROLL enacted a
simple sequence of activities for a new market entry. Here, each entry was consistent with
the prior entry and with very few new processes and limited variations in the sequence of
these processes. Though ROLL had a capability associated with executing successful
entries, it neither expanded nor fine-tuned its set of organizing processes nor did it change
its cognitive map associated with these processes.
Some scholars have observed a need to derive a clearer understanding of capability
development in uncertain environments, especially regarding the relationship between
strategy, capabilities, and performance (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Our empirical
context provides an interesting window on these phenomena. As the firms in our sample
entered a new foreign market, the social, cultural, and institutional context of their
business changed fundamentally, rendering re-use or behavioral adaptation of existing
processes a suboptimal strategic choice. This created a tension between variance (in terms
of institutional contexts) and convergence (in terms of what the firms were attempting to
do), a tension which shaped the process of learning and capability development. During
each international entry, various aspects of the start-ups’ business models were chal-
lenged, prompting these companies to reconsider their own processes.
Thus, the intensity and repetition of situational uncertainty from international entries
exposed the start-ups to multiple challenges that triggered idiosyncratic responses by each
start-up, wherein new processes were generated and, in some cases, existing processes
were modified to fit the changing decision-making context. The repetition of situational
uncertainty dramatically influenced the diversity of the start-ups’ toolkit of organizing
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processes and influenced, to a lesser extent, the dexterity in executing each process. Still,
the intensity of situational uncertainty challenged these start-ups to increase the diversity
of their organizing processes by extending or recombining existing processes rather than
devising new ones from scratch. The higher the intensity of situational uncertainty, the
more dexterity the start-ups showed in executing existing processes and in piecing
together reliable processes. Generally, they did not enact completely new processes in
highly uncertain environments. Therefore, we posit that:
Proposition 1: Repeated exposure to situational uncertainty increases the new ven-
ture’s repertoire of organizing processes. Specifically, it increases the diversity and
dexterity of the start-up’s repertoire of organizing processes.
Proposition 2: The intensity of uncertainty increases the new venture’s repertoire of
organizing processes. Specifically, high intensity of uncertainty increases the diversity
and dexterity of the start-up’s repertoire of organizing processes.
Influence of Situational Uncertainty on the Firm’s Cognitive Maps
As start-ups entered foreign markets, they often found their beliefs challenged,
prompting them to seek and test alternative approaches to organizing. At the process level,
the actions taken by these start-ups were reflective of capability development via both
trial-and-error learning and learning-by-doing. Trial-and-error learning refers to changes
to firm behavior based on insights gained from exposure to situations that refine existing
knowledge or reduce variation in activity (Argote, 1999). For example, the CEO of
HELLO commented that the start-up made numerous attempts at carving out its own value
propositions by bundling custom software with different providers in the North American
market, but failed. After a few iterations, HELLO’s managers realized that custom pack-
ages were inappropriate for this product and modified its platform and the value propo-
sition, which it leveraged for subsequent entries into European countries. Apart from
learning about the product positioning for foreign entry, the causal relationships between
organizing processes and their outcomes became transparent. HELLO had initially
opened offices in countries where founders were present but then realized that the costs of
coordination and service delivery were too high in North America, leading it to adopt a
reseller model for this market. Particularly revealing about this example was that both the
repeated exposure to situational uncertainty and the intensity of that uncertainty contrib-
uted to a greater transparency of causal relationships between process and outcome.
Learning-by-doing refers to improvements in existing processes because of repetitive
execution of the same task (Arrow, 1962). An illustrative example is SNOW’s use of
alliances to cross-sell its mobile weather forecasting services. It entered into an alliance
for the Finnish market and then used similar arrangements in other Scandinavian markets.
For each subsequent international alliance, it refined the content of agreements by learning
from the experience of its previous relationship in another market. Refinements were
made in the contracting process, content, and pricing of services. In turn, each alliance had
a marginal improvement over the previous one and became increasingly focused on the
service offered. In SNOW’s case, it is noteworthy that situational uncertainty was not high
because entry was into other Scandinavian markets. Because these markets had institu-
tional similarities, SNOW did not generate new organizing processes but rather modified
the sequence of deploying them and adjusted its cognitive map as to which sequence
would be appropriate at any given time.
In both trial-and-error and learning-by-doing processes, start-ups incorporate their
improvements as refinements to existing organizing processes or by generating new
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processes (Argote, 1999; Levitt & March, 1988). Chandler’s (1992) work on organiza-
tional change also refers to “learned routines”; he surmises that change processes are
based primarily on organizational responses to events by experimenting with new actions
which, if successful, become routinized. In our data, firms learned from their successes
and changed substantively based on their failures. For example, HELLO overestimated
the maturity of the market to accept their technology and made substantial investments
that had to be written off. The management was then more careful in subsequent entries
with regard to their processes on market analysis and adjusted their entry processes
accordingly. The VP of operations commented:
Operators were very interested [in our product]. It was discussed very much, but in the
end their ability to buy mobile marketing systems, they did not have the business
know-how. Ultimately, we did not understand mobile marketing from an operator
perspective, though an operator owns the medium [channel]. . . . We made mistakes
there, we overestimated the maturity of the market, in America, in particular. . . . We
had to exit and—instead of moving with an aggressive sales strategy—we almost
made a U-turn.
In our interviews, we gleaned that start-ups tended to enter a foreign market with a
presumptive causality between an organizing process and a desired outcome. Especially if
the firm had multiple international entry experiences, it derived its causal logic from prior
success and failure outcomes. Repeated and intense situational uncertainty triggered not
only trial-and-error processes in search of the right organizing solution, but, in many
cases, prompted the start-ups to conduct a critical review of their own beliefs about causal
relationships between organizing processes and their outcomes. Starting from established
beliefs concerning “what works” (Barr et al., 1992), exposure to foreign market condi-
tions prompted firms to investigate contingency influences in different country markets
(“what works when”) and develop hypotheses concerning underlying causal mechanisms
(“why what works when”).
Internationalization had two distinct effects on the start-ups’ cognitive maps. First, the
repeated exposure to intense uncertainty challenged hitherto hidden assumptions of the
start-ups’ organizing processes. Similar to other studies on cognition in high velocity
environments (Bogner & Barr, 2000), we found that such challenges increased the trans-
parency of cognitive maps regarding the cause–effect relationships between the deploy-
ment of specific organizing processes and their outcomes. Second, the development of
higher-order cognition enabled start-ups to recognize complex relationships and the
appropriateness of specific organizing processes in different environments; that is, it
improved the percipience of their cognitive maps. The organizing activities and related
cognitive maps appeared to complement one another so as to enhance the start-ups’ ability
to meet their goals in foreign market environments. For example, the CEO of EXCEL was
quite clear in describing the causal rationale and the importance of a shared cognition of
what works in specific markets but may not work in other segments. In our conversations,
he vigorously emphasized the need to integrate experiences and establish causal logics for
why certain outcomes were achieved from specific processes. He encouraged his team
members to challenge his arguments and question the logic behind his attributions:
[To promote] learning or best practice, the idea is to listen to each other. I listen to
somebody else’s story of what worked and why. [. . .] In Finland, people still argue
[about what is the right way] but outside Finland no one argues with the boss. The idea
is to try finding good ways of working and then try getting other people buy the idea
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as well. Results are dependent on the [individual’s] will to achieve the results and
whether the method of achieving results was right. A good idea is extremely easy to
implement poorly . . .
Heterogeneous experiences provided by intense uncertainty of foreign market entry and
repeated exposure to uncertainty from multiple entries helped firms understand cause–
effect relationships between actions and outcomes. In virtually all cases, the start-ups
faced exigencies that challenged their causal assumptions about the “best way” of doing
business in the foreign market. These resulting experiences enhanced the transparency of
cause–effect relationships between organizing processes and outcomes, and helped build
percipience with regard to which process was likely to yield the desired goals. Therefore,
we posit that:
Proposition 3: Repeated exposure to situational uncertainty positively affects the
formation of new ventures’ cognitive maps governing the deployment of its organiz-
ing processes. Specifically, it increases the transparency and percipience of a start-
up’s cognitive maps.
Proposition 4: The intensity of uncertainty positively affects the formation of new
ventures’ cognitive maps governing the deployment of organizing processes. Specifi-
cally, it increases the transparency and percipience of a start-up’s cognitive maps.
In summary, situational uncertainty presents firms with opportunities to learn. We found
that repeated and intense situational uncertainty triggered idiosyncratic responses and
generated new organizing processes, some of which achieved desired goals while others
failed. These heterogeneous experiences provided the start-up with a robust cognition of
processes that were more likely to work in a given scenario. The combination of orga-
nizing processes and a cognitive map guiding their deployment improved the capacity of
the firm to adapt not only to the focal uncertainty in the foreign market, but also
transformed the way it organized its core business in the domestic market and in other
foreign markets in which it had some presence.
Moderating Effect of Resource Fungibility
A firm’s resource endowment plays a critical function in the formation of capabilities
because resource commitments enable the execution of an organization’s capabilities
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). The presence of excess resources or slack might increase
experimentation and risk taking (George, 2005b; Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004). If
true, slack may lead to the generation of new processes and capabilities. Rather than slack,
we found that it was resource fungibility that had the most important moderating influence
on capability formation. Because start-ups often face significant resource constraints, it
makes sense that flexibility in the deployment of resources had an especially potent
relationship with capability development.
Resources are stocks of assets that are owned or controlled by the firm (Amit &
Schoemaker, 1993). In internationalization process theory, resources are seen as modera-
tors of firm exposure to foreign markets or enablers of rapid internationalization, yet the
attributes of resources have seldom been given explicit consideration (Anand & Delios,
2002). We found that resource fungibility confers an additional dimension of resource
mobility; that is, fungible resources could be transferred to foreign markets and adjusted
to fit local conditions (Anand & Delios). We observed distinct mechanisms by which
resource fungibility moderated the relationship between start-ups’ exposure to situational
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uncertainty and their development of organizing processes and cognitive maps, which are
experimentation, experience transfer, and learning through adaptation.
We observed multiple instances where resource fungibility enhanced the propensity
to engage in experimentation because it reduced the cost of deploying the same resource
for alternative purposes. Often, the fungible resources consisted of generalist human
resources, that is, people who could “react on their feet” as they were exposed to
uncertainty. The fungibility of human resources was especially salient in start-ups with
low role specialization and broader role definitions among its employees. In technology
resources, fungibility was manifested in the flexibility with which the product or service
could be adjusted to address new product platforms, standards, or delivery systems in
foreign markets; such fungibility was at times achieved through the creation of generic
and/or modular design. The CEO of CHART elaborated:
We entered the U.S. market with the idea of selling Internet-based products. After
visiting two conferences, however, we discovered that the favored product concept in
the U.S. relied on a PDA platform. This experience prompted us to check our
assumptions and redesign the product to an alternative platform. We literally put our
product development plan to the shredder and started over again. We reassigned the
product within an impressive 3 days, thanks to the generic way the software had been
designed. We also readjusted our business plan on the fly to support the new platform,
adjusting its product marketing and delivery processes accordingly.
Here, CHART could transform its strategy because its product platform was flexible. This
strategic shift involved changing the way it defined and addressed its target market and its
choice of distribution channels and support functions, which necessitated further modifi-
cations and extensions to its repertoire of organizing processes. In contrast, low resource
fungibility inhibits experimentation by increasing the cost of developing or implementing
new organizing processes and related cognitive maps. For example, CASH had started out
as a spin-off from a large firm’s finance department to sell corporate financial software
services as an application service provider. But the company had difficulty penetrating
European markets, the CEO lamented:
We had our own sales people . . . in Stockholm, London, and Luxemburg. We offered
the solution to close to 500 companies in Europe . . . [in spite of good feedback]
somehow the projects always froze and the sales cases did not proceed . . . in the end
15 of them became our customers so the hit rate was quite bad.
Later, CASH realized that the product concept simply would not work in the intended
market as the product was highly specific and the sales force had experience in selling to
large firms; modifying its processes was onerous because of low fungibility of its resource
endowments.
We also found that resources embodied heterogeneous experiences and that redeploy-
ing fungible resources (especially human) could, in effect, transfer cumulative heteroge-
neous experiences from one market to the other. To continue the CASH example, the firm
went on to hire a manager responsible for its international markets. This individual
devised a novel and efficient approach to sales, largely because he could learn from
experiences in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and Portugal. This
manager, who spoke five languages, commuted between these countries to supervise sales
operations. On discovering that the United Kingdom was a difficult market in which to
initiate corporate contacts, he improvised a new marketing and sales technique to deal
with this challenge, which was subsequently successfully deployed in other markets.
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Resource fungibility enabled the start-ups to better understand cause–effect relation-
ships in different contexts, as resources were shifted from one to another. Experience
transfer gave rise both to a stronger transparency and percipience of the start-ups’ cog-
nitive maps. Some degree of resource adaptation to local conditions was usually neces-
sary, triggering processes of sensemaking as firms needed to understand what changes in
organizing processes were required to respond to situational uncertainty. Furthermore,
in being able to deploy the same resources in alternative situations, the start-up learned
not only about new contexts through a well-understood lens (i.e., the fungible resource),
it also learned more about the resource itself by examining its effects in a new context. In
summary, resource fungibility enabled start-ups to experiment with alternative organizing
activities, contributing to a greater diversity, dexterity, and depth of their organizing
processes. Particularly through resource transfer and adaptation mechanisms under con-
ditions of high situational uncertainty, resource fungibility facilitated sense-making pro-
cesses which improved the transparency and percipience of the start-ups’ cognitive maps
by improving its understanding of its own capabilities and of the new context. Therefore,
we propose:
Proposition 5: Resource fungibility positively moderates the relationship between
situational uncertainty and a new venture’s repertoire of organizing activities. Spe-
cifically, fungibility increases the positive impact of repeated and intense situational
uncertainty on the diversity and dexterity of its repertoire of organizing activities.
Proposition 6: Resource fungibility positively moderates the relationship between
situational uncertainty and a new venture’s cognitive maps governing the deployment
of its organizing activities. Specifically, fungibility increases the positive impact of
repeated and intense situational uncertainty on the transparency and percipience of the
start-up’s cognitive maps.
Moderating Effect of Prior Shared Experiences
Research on capability formation in start-ups emphasizes the role of previous work
experiences of founders (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Mosa-
kowski, 1998). Prior experience of the team influences the dynamics of decision making,
including entry into new markets, by invoking the belief that certain solutions should work
for a given market (e.g., Helfat & Lieberman). These prehistory experiences provide
schemas for action and legitimize these actions through storytelling and narratives
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).
We detected variability in the organizing processes developed by the start-ups when
the feedback from existing actions deviated from expected outcomes. First, if entrepre-
neurs had accumulated significant prehistory experience in an industry sector, they tended
to apply “tried and true” processes that had worked before. Conversely, if the team had
little experience in the sector, it was more open to alternative solutions. For these teams,
an uncertainty-induced problem would readily trigger a trial-and-error learning process, in
an effort to understand how ex ante expectations and processes should be modified so as
to obtain the desired objectives.
Those start-ups with substantial shared prior experience appeared reluctant to revise
interpretations based on foreign market feedback, which retarded efforts to devise alter-
native solutions. It appeared that their repeated exposure to familiar action–outcome
relationships strengthened their beliefs in existing assumptions on causality. Therefore,
the more prior experience top managers shared, the less they altered processes, even if
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situational uncertainty was high. For example, when EXCEL attempted its first interna-
tional expansion in the late 1990s by acquiring a Swedish software project company, the
team had difficulty in managing this subsidiary because of cultural differences. In spite of
recognizing that these differences exist, some managers continued to force fit their
organizing processes to the Swedish subsidiary:
Even if we went as close to Sweden, I could say now that I still don’t understand how
the decision making and communication culture works. [. . .] For example, if in
Finland I raised my voice on the hallway and said that something has to be done like
this and that, people would stand up, argue and ask if we could do it some other way.
If I did the same in Sweden, people would go to their rooms and you wouldn’t see
them until the following day. Then you would notice in the kitchen and in other places
that they would discuss in depth what had happened and it seemed that things would
revert to the same old informal routines . . .
The managing director went on to describe how he had tried to change the way the
subsidiary did business because “. . . we know from our experience how this should be
done.” Still market entry failed because they “. . . just would not get it.” Eventually,
EXCEL had to abandon its acquisition because it felt that it could not transfer its processes
and cognitive maps to other markets.
Conversely, we noticed that if the team had little previous experience in its target
sector, it was ready to experiment with different entry modes. A problem would trigger an
informed trial-and-error learning process, during which teams scanned and sometimes
even tested alternative organizing processes to find an optimal solution. Sometimes firms
simultaneously executed multiple alternative processes and strengthened their repertoire
of organizing activities and related cognitive maps. For example, STAR adopted a three-
pronged strategy of partnerships, direct sales through traditional and innovative industry
channels, and bundling its product offering with strategic partners’ products that enjoyed
established clientele within the sector. Therefore, if the start-up’s management team had
fewer shared prehistory experiences, it could search and test the market more extensively
as its responses were not conditioned by previous, and possibly incompatible, experi-
ences. By relying on shared experiences, firms emphasize a notion of their success
experiences (i.e., “what worked”) over generating new schemas and solutions, falling into
a competence trap (Levinthal & March, 1993). Therefore, we posit that:
Proposition 7: The degree of shared experiences of the entrepreneurial team nega-
tively moderates the positive impact of repeated and intense situational uncertainty on
the development of organizing activities. Specifically, the greater the prior shared
experience, the lower will be the increase in the diversity and dexterity of organizing
activities resulting from repeated and intense uncertainty.
Proposition 8: The degree of shared experiences of the entrepreneurial team nega-
tively moderates the positive impact of repeated and intense situational uncertainty on
the development of cognitive maps. Specifically, the greater the prior shared experi-
ence, the lower will be the increase in the transparency and percipience of cognitive
maps resulting from repeated and intense uncertainty.
A Research Agenda on Capability Development in New Firms
Our qualitative study was designed to provide initial evidence and trigger areas for
future research. We contribute in two areas in particular: first, to the emergent literature on
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organizational capability development in entrepreneurial firms (Zahra et al., 2006); and
second, to the already well-established literature on international entrepreneurship. We
contribute to the first by highlighting salient microprocesses that govern the creation of
new organizational capabilities in entrepreneurial firms. We contribute to the second by
opening up the black box of internationalization learning and by demonstrating the
processes through which internationalization may give rise to organizational advantage.
Speaking to the capabilities literature, this study provides insights that may not have been
possible in a deductive study, thereby making two key contributions: (1) the importance of
situational uncertainty as a trigger for developing a language of organizing and (2) the role
of learning from heterogeneous experiences on capability development. In this section, we
build on our findings to propose a theoretical foundation for work in learning and
capabilities in new ventures.
The Language of Organizing: Implications for Capabilities
and Entrepreneurship
The emergent literature on organizational capabilities in entrepreneurial firms sug-
gests that entrepreneurial firms are not simply new and small versions of incumbents
(Bingham et al., 2007; Sine et al., 2006; Zahra et al., 2006). From the perspective of
entrepreneurship, some of the constraints of theories developed in large firm contexts are
obvious. First, new firms are seldom started with an organizational heritage of well-
formed capabilities, which emphasizes the creation of de novo capabilities over the
modification of existing ones. Second, the sources of inertia are likely to be different in
new and small organizations, where there usually is no layer of middle managers to
separate top management from operations. Our study has contributed to the literature on
entrepreneurial capabilities by showing how, in entrepreneurial firms, the development of
routines, as well as repetitive application, matters to the development of change capabili-
ties. Thus, in contrast to incumbents, the likelihood of an entrepreneurial firm of imple-
menting successful change tends to initially increase as a function of management team
experience and organizational age. Our findings also highlight the importance of the
interaction of routine-based and cognitive logics for the development of organizational
capabilities (Bingham et al.). This interaction may be particularly salient for entrepre-
neurial firms, given the absence of well-formed and deeply embedded organizational
routines as well as the absence of a middle management layer. In entrepreneurial firms,
thus, the link between managerial cognition and capability deployment is likely to be
particularly direct, highlighting the salience of top management team’s cognitive pro-
cesses for the entrepreneurial firm’s ability to proactively adjust.
In our sample, we found evidence of a strong association between situational uncer-
tainty and the rate and speed with which start-ups developed their repertoire of organizing
processes and the attendant cognitive maps. There are two issues embedded in the
relationship between organizing processes and cognitive maps that merit further discus-
sion: (1) the organization became aware of its repertoire, or vocabulary, of skill-based
routines and nonroutine processes and (2) an inclination to deploy certain combinations
of actions under certain triggers of situational uncertainty; that is, a grammar or shared
understanding of which actions or sequence of actions are deployed when a specific
condition is observed. Capabilities arose from the interplay of a firm’s cognitive maps and
its repertoire of organizational processes, where the language of organizing is the aware-
ness of the vocabulary of organizational processes and the comprehension of their
situation-specific combinations that allow the start-up to adapt to its environment.
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The vocabulary of organizing focuses on processes, rather than on an exclusive
reliance on routines, as constituent elements of capabilities. Most studies on capabilities
emphasize the skill-based aspect of capabilities; routines are executed deftly, which
improves performance outcomes (Winter, 2003). An alternative research stream empha-
sizes a language-based argument that is typically grounded in sociological perspectives of
work in nonfirm settings such as university residence halls (Feldman & Pentland, 2003).
Language-based explanations stress routinization as well, but from a shared understand-
ing perspective. In taking this perspective, we substantially extend recent research on
entrepreneurial cognition (e.g., Bingham, 2009; Grégoire Barr, et al., 2010; Grégoire,
Corbett, et al., 2010; Haynie et al., 2010; McKelvie et al., 2010) to capability develop-
ment and deployment. Our results suggest that language-based and skill-based explana-
tions of capabilities are required to build a comprehensive theory of capabilities. Clearly,
an organization is capable of doing something only when it can reliably execute processes,
which emphasizes skill-based arguments. However, adaptive behaviors and changes
within processes can be more fully explained using cognitive and language-based expla-
nations of capabilities. Therefore, combining both perspectives enables researchers to
provide compelling rationales to the selection of specific organizing processes as
responses to the environment from a plurality of possible combinations, an issue that is
fundamental to understanding the process of organizational adaptation to competitive
environments.
A second and related issue is that capabilities are often represented as the culminating
effect of routines and resource configurations rather than the process of search for optimal
solutions. While some studies explicitly articulate that capabilities can evolve over time
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), this dynamism needs to account for changes in underlying
processes along with shifts in resource endowments. Our analysis reveals a grammar of
organizing: capabilities are moving targets and firms engage in a continuous search for fit
between the external context and internal resource conditions rather than existing in a
relatively “steady state” or “best” configuration.
In our sample, resource fungibility, in particular human capital endowments, played a
key role in the speed with which new processes are generated or modified. In several firms,
entry into multiple foreign markets was made possible by the ease with which employees
could be moved between markets or if employees possessed skills to operate in very
different markets. This observation is consistent with Rindova and Kotha (2001), who
found that in hypercompetitive environments, firms continuously “morph” their organi-
zation structure and resources to support the changing demands placed on their systems as
markets evolved. In that regard, capabilities are neither the normative “best practice” nor
are they culminating “end-states” that reflect appropriate routine and resource configura-
tions. Instead, we find that, for new and established ventures alike, capabilities are
continually evolving combinations of organizing processes and cognitive maps that allow
organizations to reliably execute optimal solutions in uncertain markets.
Several potential extensions follow directly from our notion of language for organiz-
ing. For example, what individual, firm, or industrial-level factors foster or hinder its
development? Similarly, are there settings in which particular importance has to be
attributed to the language of organizing? Most likely, this may be the case for contexts in
which the importance of cognitive understanding significantly outweighs the potential of
behavioral learning. Thus, the existence of a language for organizing may play a more
significant role when process outcomes are hard to replicate, are tacit, or are intangible, a
description that seems apt for many high-technology or project-based industries as well as
services. Moreover, regarding the effect of experience on the development of capabilities,
while our findings show that shared experience exhibits a negative effect, future research
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may inquire into the role of diverse past experience. Is more diversity in past experience
always good? Or, is there a certain degree of common ground that is necessary for past
experience to be conducive to the development of a language for organizing? Finally, do
other contextual factors exist that may moderate the effect of past experience on the
formation of organizational capabilities?
Learning to Be Capable: Heterogeneous Experiences,
Migration, and Mutability
A central contribution for the learning literature lies in articulating the causal mecha-
nisms by which new firms learn to build capabilities. Organizational learning literature
emphasizes the importance of the cumulative effect of experiences on firm behaviors
(Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Bingham et al., 2007; Fiol, 1994). Similarly, recent
studies also highlight the importance of learning from failure for performance and survival
(Corbett et al., 2007; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Miner et al., 1999). By emphasizing
a cumulative learning effect, researchers have extended learning arguments to capability
development (George, 2005a). However, the impact of heterogeneous experiences, in the
form of organizational success and failure, has received little attention. In this study, we
explain how heterogeneous learning experiences influence the formation of capabilities.
Particularly, our data indicate that uncertainty-induced problems create multiple oppor-
tunities for the new venture to learn and (1) expand the diversity of its organizing
processes and (2) improve the dexterity with which these are executed. Also, situational
uncertainty challenges the causal assumptions between executing a process and its desired
outcomes. By succeeding or failing, the causal assumptions are challenged or strength-
ened and improve (1) the transparency with which processes are linked to outcomes and
(2) the percipience of firms to recognize which processes are likely to work and under
what conditions.
Heterogeneous experiences thus allow firms to develop superior mental maps explain-
ing the efficacy and recombinability of organizational processes. This has two distinct, yet
related effects on their ability to develop and deploy new organizational capabilities
constituted by such processes. First, an improved understanding of “why what works
when” will increase the organization’s ability to re-use existing processes and apply them
in varying contexts. In our sample, several start-ups leveraged their experiences to
improve their business model or their domestic operations in addition to their foreign
markets. This observation indicates that there may be migratory applications in capabili-
ties developed out of heterogeneous experiences, which should also be fundamental to
explaining how firms can adapt dynamically to ever-changing environments, extending
the applicability of our findings to the context of dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt &
Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). Second, increased transparency and percipience will
foster mutability of organizational processes and capabilities. Our data suggest that variety
of experience renders organizing processes and cognitive maps more easily mutable; that
is, experiences allowed start-ups to develop a broad understanding of how their business
model worked and how the underlying capabilities could be changed and reorganized
under different environmental conditions to accomplish organizational objectives. The
causal understanding of how different processes work or do not work together in varying
environments allows for continuous adaptation in the deployment of capabilities by
composing them using different and appropriate combinations of organizing processes
that are part of the firm’s language of organizing. As a consequence, we argue that
learning from heterogeneous experiences is an essential part in explaining how firms, by
developing robust mental maps about the cause–effect relationships of organizational
30 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY and PRACTICE
processes, become dynamically adaptable. Thus, their dynamic capabilities will be a
result of their understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying organizational pro-
cesses, and how these can be (re)combined in different contexts to be deployed as new
capabilities.
In addition, these results highlight several interesting and fruitful areas of research.
For example, do heterogeneous learning experiences lead to more robust capabilities that
have broader applications? Why and how does success and failure experience improve
adaptability and, do the two operate to the same degree and in the same causal pathways?
What factors influence the mutability of organizing processes? Why are some capabilities
more migratory in application than others? How does redundancy in organizational
processes influence capability development and mutability? By asking these related ques-
tions, researchers could investigate learning at multiple levels of analysis. For example, if
processes are generated by individuals or by teams, how does individual success or failure
experience influence team or organizational capabilities? How do firms build a process by
combining pieces from multiple experiences or prior routines? While this study sheds
some light on these issues, it encourages systematic analysis of the influence of learning
on the micro- and macroprocesses of capability formation.
Internationalization Learning and Learning to Internationalize
For the international entrepreneurship literature, our findings imply two salient impli-
cations. First, our study suggests that internationalization is a distinctively different form
of organizational diversification, as it combines convergence with divergence. Conver-
gence is created in the form of what the firm seeks to “do” (Winter, 2003) in the foreign
market, as most foreign market entries seek to extend the firm’s current business model for
application in cross-border markets. This introduces a subtle adaptation need, as the firm’s
technological focus or its market segment (apart from the geographical market) does not
necessarily change in any obvious way. Instead, internationalization adds an additional
layer of external uncertainty to the market and technological uncertainty to which the new
firm is already subjected (Autio, Bruneel, & Clarysse, 2010). This way, new venture
internationalization offers a particularly opportune context for studying how organizations
develop new capabilities. Our study shows that the study of such processes in the
international new venture context has the potential to contribute toward the broader
organizational literature.
Second, our study has contributed toward the literature on international entrepreneur-
ship by opening up the black box of internationalization learning, as well as illuminating
some of the microprocesses underlying “learning advantages of newness” (Sapienza et al.,
2006). Our findings suggest that such effects arise from an intricate interplay between
managerial cognition and incipient processes in entrepreneurial organizations and they
may constitute a potentially important formative source of competitive advantage in
entrepreneurial firms. Together with the growing body of research on new venture inter-
nationalization, our study shows how new venture internationalization constitutes a dis-
tinctively different form of internationalization, the study of which will benefit from the
development of dedicated theoretical frameworks (Bingham, 2009). Future entrepreneur-
ship research should continue to exploit the opportunities offered by this exciting context.
Deriving New Questions: Triggers, Individuals,
and Internationalization Capabilities
Our results suggest areas of research relating to how new capabilities emerge and
solidify in new ventures. By using the developed concepts, we encourage future studies to
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take a closer look at the constituting elements of capabilities (the vocabulary of organiz-
ing), the conditions that lead to their emergence and formation (grammar), and aspects
that foster cognitive learning (heterogeneous experiences). Derived from these concepts,
and in addition to the questions we have raised earlier, in the following, we highlight three
avenues which we think are of particular importance to the field of entrepreneurship,
namely triggers of capability emergence, the role of individual imprints, and capabilities
in new venture internationalization.
What causes a start-up to develop and deploy new capabilities? Our results point
toward an external stimulus, situational uncertainty, and how subsequent cognitive learn-
ing leads to the formation of capabilities. This raises the question of whether and how
internal stimuli, such as strategic planning, initiate emergence and development of new
capabilities. Because of its direct connection to the literature on opportunity recognition,
discovery, and creation (e.g., Bingham et al., 2007; Grégoire, Corbett, et al., 2010; Haynie
et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2007), this question is of central importance to the field of
entrepreneurship. We are confident that a perspective that is conscious of cognition
processes will prove to be particularly informative on this subject. Moreover, we think that
this perspective will also be value-adding to recent discussions on dynamic capabilities in
entrepreneurship. In particular, Zahra et al. (2006) propose in a conceptual paper that
situational uncertainty facilitates the development and use of dynamic capabilities, also
suggesting that it is external rather than internal triggers that foster the emergence of
dynamic capabilities in new ventures. Our notion of organizational grammar may aid
researchers to better address the question of how new ventures learn to dynamically
reconfigure their resources and processes. In addition, empirical research on this issue and
its boundary conditions are still absent from the entrepreneurship literature.
When we examine the role of individuals in capability formation, our study gives clear
indication that both founders as well as individual employees might affect this process.
First, our findings show that an important outcome of convergence in an organization’s
cognitive maps and the sophistication in the language of organizing is the top management
team’s ability to express identity and communicate strategy to its customers and other
stakeholders. In our sample, managers emphasized that entering specific markets revealed
their own strengths and limitations that, in turn, helped to effectively develop and execute
their strategy. As a consequence, we find that managerial skill and expertise show a direct
relation to the development of a language for organizing. Second, our findings on the
negative impact of shared experience strongly support the notion of founder imprints (e.g.,
Burton & Beckman, 2007). Future research should look at whether and how founder
imprints may impact the language of organizing and, thus, new capability development
and deployment, even after considerable time has passed since the inception of the venture
or even after they have left the firm. Finally, we see that individual employees themselves,
in particular when they represent important “fungible human capital,” may have a sub-
stantial impact on capability formation. Whether or not such individuals are capable of
leaving residual imprints on the processes they help initiate is still an open question.
Generally, our findings echo recent calls for research on the microfoundations of
capabilities.
Finally, recent work has evoked renewed interest in learning and capability develop-
ment during internationalization (Bingham, 2009; Bingham et al., 2007; Sapienza et al.,
2006). Our study suggests that internationalization, in the context of new ventures, may
give rise to learning and capability development. A start-up is subjected to a series of tests
during which its business model and related organizing processes are repeatedly chal-
lenged, a process that could be likened to a serial “trial-by-fire” (Swaminathan, 1996).
Here, learning is different from what has been described in the internationalization
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literature, where it is seen as a behavioral regulator of incremental escalation of commit-
ment (Andersen, 1993) and learning during internationalization is confined to institutional
conditions or the process of internationalization (Delios & Henisz, 2003). As a conse-
quence, we call for future research to look at cognitive processes that lead to the devel-
opment and deployment of capabilities conducive to internationalization. We are confident
that our concept of language for organizing can be helpful in extending the little research
which is implicitly (e.g., Nadkarni & Perez, 2007) or explicitly (e.g., Bingham) taking a
cognitive perspective on new venture internationalization.
Moreover, in our data, internationalizing start-ups confronted the tension between
convergence of objectives to be achieved and divergence of institutional contexts in
which to achieve them through a process of capability development, with far-
reaching implications for the start-up’s ability to manage not only the market entry but
also its domestic business. This observation supports some theorists’ contentions that
new venture internationalization may be different from both late, reactive modes
of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) as well as from multinational
firm internationalization (McDougall et al., 1994). Their heterogeneous experiences
during internationalization may render international start-ups more innovative and proac-
tive than their domestic-focused counterparts. That is, such firms may be more innovative
because they have internationalized, rather than becoming internationalized because they
possessed innovative capabilities. This dynamic of opportunity-driven capability forma-
tion merits continued research and attention by international management scholars.
Limitations and Conclusion
For any qualitative study, the limitation of narrow sampling and scope is apparent, and
this longitudinal field study is no exception. Regardless of all due care in design, selection,
data collection, and analysis, we cannot dismiss the possibility that some observations
may have been different had we chosen a different industry or home country. For example,
the propensity to venture across borders or to experiment with business models and
processes may be different in less technology-intensive industries or in countries with
more (or fewer) bordering countries or with larger (or smaller) home markets. Neverthe-
less, these selections were not idiosyncratic or uncommon, and the increased insight made
available by limiting variance in these important contextual variables made it worthwhile.
Furthermore, we were not interested so much in the propensity to internationalize as in
how firms internationalizing develop the capabilities to do so.
Indeed, the primary thrust in this article was to identify causal factors that influence
the development of capabilities in start-ups. To that end, we were quite successful. Our
data from the interviews and follow-on visits revealed adequate variability that helped
capture the essence of capabilities in start-ups, that is, the language of organizing.
Identifying the relationship between situational uncertainty and the generation of organi-
zational processes and its attendant cognitive maps are our study’s key contributions to the
literature. As firms learn, they develop new vocabulary and increase their comprehension
of their internal processes that allow them to reconfigure their business models. We found
that repeated and intense situational uncertainty, as caused by internationalization, quick-
ened this learning process in start-ups and expedited the adaptation to market environ-
ments. Organizational factors, resource fungibility, and shared experiences were
important determinants of the variability in capability development across start-ups. We
encourage further examination of the emergence and evolution of capabilities in start-ups.
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